Teddy asked: Does Socrates believe that in order to be a human being one must reason and question? Where does he state this if this is true? Phil asked: If the behaviourist theory is accurate, if you lose the ability to speak, or express yourself in any other physical way, does the mind cease to exist?Other times, people submit absurdly broad questions -- questions that define entire subsets of philosophy and have occupied generations of attention without any resolution:
Peter asked: What is meaning? Moustapha asked: What should we change in our today'society in order to live a good life?Occasionally, I find what are obviously test questions or essay assignments:
Stephanie asked: Which of the following types of arguments are evaluated with the terms strong and weak? A) Deductive B) Inductive Which of the following types of arguments are evaluated with the terms valid and invalid A) Inductive B) DeductiveAnd my favorite of all are the questions that have nothing to do with philosophy whatsoever (that is, as much as anything can fail to have anything to do with philosophy):
Tobias asked: How did Kennedy's assassination affect the American Psyche? Jade asked: If you have said something about your boyfriend and then he breaks up with you but you still like him and you think he might just might still like what do you do? Especially when you think you might love him.Apparently, you ask a philosopher, Jade.
But by giving new legal status to a fetus, it "will clearly place into federal law a definition of life that will chip away at the right to choose as outlined in Roe v. Wade," the 1973 Supreme Court decision that established a woman's constitutional right to an abortion, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said.I haven't read Roe v. Wade in a long time -- I don't remember whether it includes a stipulation as to whether a fetus is alive. If it did, and the bill contradicts it, then it's unconstitutional and someone should say so. If it doesn't, then Roe doesn't depend on such a definition. In general, slippery slope arguments are just plain bad. If there's something wrong with the *bill*, then say what it is. After all, if there's *nothing* wrong with the bill, and it's a just law that should be adopted, AND, as the Democrats are alleging, it would undermine Roe v. Wade, that's at least a prima facia case that Roe v. Wade ought to be undermined.
I will now relate a dream I had a couple of years ago. Those of you who've known me a while are rather likely to have heard it before. I dreamt that I met Alyson Hannigan at some kind of event where there were a lot of celebrities. I engaged in a conversation with her, and confessed to having a large crush on her Buffy character, Willow. Alyson smiled her adorable Willow-smile and leaned close to me and whispered in my ear that it was too bad that Willow was gay. If she weren't, Alyson thought she might've liked me. Happy Birthday, Alyson.
Its leaders, including Martin Luther King Jr., drew sustenance from a prophetic religious tradition, and took a much darker view of human nature. King wrote an important essay on Jeremiah, the "rebel prophet" who saw that his nation was in moral decline. ... Because the experiences of the Hebrew prophets had taught them to be pessimistic about humanity, the civil rights leaders knew they had to be spiritually aggressive if they wanted to get anything done. Chappell argues that the civil rights movement was not a political movement with a religious element. It was a religious movement with a political element. If you believe that the separation of church and state means that people should not bring their religious values into politics, then, if Chappell is right, you have to say goodbye to the civil rights movement. It would not have succeeded as a secular force.I'm not sure how exactly to reconstruct the argument. It's a really bad argument if it looks like this: the leaders of the civil rights movement were religious, therefore it was a religious movement. A more likely and more charitable intended interpretation is this: insights from religious texts into human nature were vitally important to the civil rights movement, therefore it was a religious movement. It's a slightly better argument, but it's still invalid -- the (alleged) fact that reading the Bible helped people to understand human nature and more effectively change social policies doesn't make it a religious movement. I don't want to be arguing too much yet -- if the facts are right, which I'll assume they are, then this is an instance of religion affecting positive change in society. But the column continues:
Whether you believe in God or not, the Bible and commentaries on the Bible can be read as instructions about what human beings are like and how they are likely to behave. Moreover, this biblical wisdom is deeper and more accurate than the wisdom offered by the secular social sciences, which often treat human beings as soulless utility-maximizers, or as members of this or that demographic group or class. Whether the topic is welfare, education, the regulation of biotechnology or even the war on terrorism, biblical wisdom may offer something that secular thinking does not -- not pat answers, but a way to think about things. ... The lesson I draw from all this is that ... maybe theology should be mandatory [in public schools]. Students should be introduced to the prophets, to the Old and New Testaments, to the Koran, to a few of the commentators who argue about these texts.Now this is just silly. Religious texts can provide valuable insights into human behavior, therefore they should be mandatory reading in public schools? LOTS of things can provide valuable insights into human behavior. Take away the religious claims and religious texts are (at best) good literature -- and there's lots of secular good literature too.
"It's all relative in West Virginia." From the AP story:
[West Virginia Governor Bob] Wise said the T-shirt depicts "an unfounded, negative stereotype of West Virginia." "I write to you today to demand that you immediately remove this item from your stores and your print and online catalogues," Wise wrote. "In addition, these shirts must be destroyed at once to avoid any possibility of resale and proof be given thereof."I don't get it. Is the joke that the state's name merely relativizes it to another state, thereby undermining its integrity or completeness? That's a stereotype? (And if it is, it's surely a founded one.) I feel like I must be missing something.
I'm ashamed to discover that I'm not even among the top 100 google hits for brown philosophy student blog. I feel like I'm entitled to that search, since this a blog of a Brown philosophy student. I hope to appear there soon.This was two days ago. This morning I am the number three hit for that search. And Brian, you'd better look out -- I'm aiming for number one. (One must admit I deserve it more than he does -- after all, I actually am a Brown philosophy student.) *Or so you assume.
Gibson to film Jewish 'Western'Honestly, this story would make a perfectly good bit of satire.
"The bad news is I won't be back with the Bucs," Sapp said by telephone from Miami. "The good news is I'm a Raider."Can we make sense of this? After all, there is an important sense in which Sapp's being a Raider is the same piece of news as Sapp's not being a Buc. This is to be distinguished from a mere entailment relation -- it's quite sensible to say, for instance, something like this:
"The good news is that I'm not in debt. The bad news is I'm bankrupt."This seems to me to be acceptable, even though bankruptcy conceptually entails freedom from debt. It merely picks out different consequences of an action. Sapp's quotation does not seem to fit this model -- it's not just that being a non-Buc is a consequence of being a Raider -- being a non-Buc is constitutive of being a Raider. Also, Raiders suck.
A [Wisconsin] state agency is accusing a pharmacist of blocking a woman's attempts to refill her birth control prescription because of his religious beliefs. ... Christopher Klein, spokesman for the Department of Regulation and Licensing, said pharmacists have the right to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions, as long as they transfer the prescriptions to another pharmacy if the patient asks. ...Mr. Noesen was the only pharmacist on duty on the weekend when a woman came in to refill her birth control prescription. He had told the managing pharmacist that he would not fill contraceptive prescriptions because he considered them in violation of his religious beliefs. The woman later went to another pharmacy, but Mr. Noesen allegedly refused to transfer the prescription when that pharmacy called. The woman even returned to the Kmart with two police officers, but Mr. Noesen still refused, and police took no action, authorities said. Finally, she got the prescription refilled when the managing pharmacist returned to work that Monday.This story is more upsetting than the last one for the following several reasons:
And as publicity about "The Passion" grew in the weeks before its release, NBC ordered a pilot of an apocalyptic show called "Revelations," partly based on the Book of Revelation. One of its producers, Gavin Polone, described it as being along the lines of "The X-Files," but about a nun and a skeptical scientist who begin to believe in the Bible as the events of Armageddon begin to happen.To this, I mostly raise a bemused eyebrow. But then I raise my other eyebrow and stop being bemused when I read:
In his pitch to the networks, he said, he cited polls in which 78 percent of Americans said they believed that the events of Revelation would occur and 39 percent said they believed that those events would happen in their lifetime.Last month, I was shocked to read allegations that 60% of the American population believes that the events of Genesis are literally true. 78% for Revelations sounds just plain ridiculous -- especially since the BBC report I read last month said that "only" 74% of Americans believe in the afterlife. Even if we allow some pretty reasonable statistical error, I have to believe that a substantial number of, say, non-Christian religous people would believe in the afterlife but not the events of Revelations. (And since the events of Revelations directly logically imply the afterlife, no one can believe in the former without believing in the latter.) In conclusion, I want to see these so-called "polls". (Also, I find it more believable but just as ridiculous that half of the people who believe that the events of Revelations will occur believe that it will occur in their lifetimes. Why would they think that? The odds of that, even given that it will happen sometime, are astronomically small. Like, zero. Hmm... probability gets interesting when we're talking once-in-eternity...) UPDATE: When it comes to money, religion isn't everything.
Bubba's IQ is 95. Bubba is confronted with the choice of whether or not to press the big red button. The big red button, if pressed, would have the following result: God will empty the bank account of every person whose IQ is higher than 100, and give the money to those whose IQ is lower than 100.Clearly, it is in Bubba's interest to press the button. (Assume money is good.) I don't know how to evaluate the proposed biconditional, though. Is it the case that it would be in Bubba+'s subjective interest for Bubba to press the button? I don't know. Bubba+, who has an IQ much higher than 100 would, if he existed, be worse off if the button got pressed. Then again, Bubba+ doesn't exist -- we could think of him as a fictional character, but that won't help; fictional characters only have fictional interests, and there's no reason that Bubba+ should fictionally have an interest in the button being pressed (either in the real world or the fictional world). Jamie's response to this kind of suggestion was to push the idea that Bubba+ is the same person as Bubba. Well, ok... but he's still different in an important way. And it still seems like it would be in Bubba's interest to press the button, but not in Bubba+'s. So that looks like a problem. But I recognize that I'm pretty confused about the argument. *Do fellow graduate students count as colleagues? Or do I have to have a job before I can have colleagues?
1. A single grain of wheat is not a heap. 2. For any number n, if n grains of wheat are not a heap, then neither are n+1 grains. 3. Therefore, there is no number n such that n grains is enough to make a heap.An alternative formulation which would also count as a sorites paradox is this:
1. A single grain of wheat is not a heap. 2.1. If 1 grain of wheat is not a heap, then neither is 2 grains. 2.2. If 2 grains of wheat are not a heap, then neither are 3 grains. ... 2.999999. If 999,999 grains of wheat are not a heap, then neither are 1,000,000. 3. Therefore, by a million applications of modus ponens, 1,000,000 grains are not a heap.What's notable is that the arguments appear valid, each premise is intuitively true, and the conclusion is intuitively false. I think this might be a good formal definition of a sorites:
An argument is soritical if and only if it meets all of the following conditions:I think that a formulation very much like this might come from Barnes.
- it is of this form, where F is the soritical predicate (‘is not a heap’, for instance):
Fa1 If Fa1 then Fa2 If Fa2 then Fa3 … If Fai-1 then Fai Therefore, Fai (where i can be arbitrarily large)- {a1, ... ai} is initially ordered, with each adjacent pair indiscriminable with respect to F.
- Fa1 is intuitively true.
- Fai is intuitively false.
An extremely reliable predictor of human behavior places two boxes -- a clear one and a black one -- on the table. He's going to give you the choice between taking (1) just the black one, or (2) both of them. But he's already predicted which choice you'll take. And if he predicted that you'll take just the black one, then he put a million dollars under it. If he predicted that you'll take both of them, then he put nothing under it. Either way, he also puts $1000 under the clear one. Which choice do you take?I, who am a two-boxer, reason like this, which seems perfectly obvious to me: no matter what he's predicted, I'm better off, by $1000, taking both. That's because there either is a million dollars or there is not a million dollars in the black box, which means there is a total of either $1000 or $1,001,000 on the table, and I don't get to pick which. So I should take all of the money on the table. Allan, who is a one-boxer, offers this argument for one-boxism (Matt, who is also a one-boxer, has not told us why he is, but maybe it's for a reason like this):
P1: There is a strong probabilistic connection between taking one box and getting a million dollars (i.e. 99% of people who take one box get a million dollars). P2: There is a strong probabilistic connection between taking two boxes and getting a thousand dollars (i.e. 99% of people who take two boxes get a thousand dollars). C: I should take one box (if I want more money).Even if the premises are correct, I think that the argument is invalid. Once the predictor has done his predicting, Allan just doesn't have any say in the matter of whether he gets that million. The "strong probabilistic connection" is not causal. I think that the underlying structure of the probabilistic connection actually looks like this:
It's really easy to make a Sorites paradox out of 'is better than', although you have to use fictional objects. Here's how I'd do it. Start with some things that are relatively close in quality, say Joe Montana and Steve Young. (I'm assuming in the context 'better than' means 'better quarterback than over their careers'. And I'll assume Joe is better than Steve. That last assumption can obviously be amended depending on your view of recent history.) Now consider a string of quarterbacks each of them mostly like Joe Montana, but each one a teensy bit worse than the one before. For each n>0, Joen completed one fewer pass in some regular season game, or completed one pass for slightly fewer yards, than did Joen-1. I take for large enough n, Joen is not better than actual Steve. But it's vague where the crossover occurs.There are two interesting things here. The first, which I already pointed to, is that I don't think this is a sorites argument. The implicit generating step seems to be, 'for any n, if Joe-n is better than Quarterback X, then so is Joe-n-1. But that's not just non-intuitive, it's obviously false -- let Quarterback X equal Joe-n-1. So I don't think this is a sorites, since the generating steps in sorites arguments are intuitively true. But the other noteworthy thing about Brian's argument is that it does tend to convince me of his conclusion, that 'is a better quarterback than' is vague. I talked to Brian briefly about this today. One interesting thing that I learned was that there is not a philosophical consensus as to whether all vague predicates can play the soritical role in sorites arguments. The quarterback story to me counts as evidence that not all of them can. (Although Brian hinted at an additional worry that I don't yet fully understand about the difference between vagueness and indeterminacy -- so I may want to end up saying that 'is a better quarterback than' isn't vague after all.) He recommended a paper which I've added near the top of my reading list and hope to get to in the next couple days:
Patrick Greenough, "Vagueness: A Minimal Theory", Mind, Vol. 112, 446, April 2003, pp. 236-281.Since I respect Brian's opinion on such matters, I will go ahead and recommend the paper to you, based on his recommendation to me.
There's no ethical obligation to be "honest" in argumentation in this sense. Arguments exist in the abstract; people are just argument delivery devices. If there exists an argument that shows that my philosophy is inconsistent so that I have to adjust the philosophy or change a position or even consciously choose to live with an inconsistency, I should deal with that argument, regardless of whether the guy presenting the argument is self-serving or a creep or Hitler.I think that this is right, but I think it's so obviously right that it barely needed to be said. Consider: the following form of argument is utterly uncontroversial:
Suppose A. [Reasoning from A to B] Therefore, if A then B.The supposition there is not an affirmation. It is a 'pretend this is true, and we'll see where it would take us'. So if I were to argue, for instance, that the principles of Christianity implied that we should legalize homosexual marriage, the fact that I don't believe the principles of Christianity in no way impugns my argument. In particular, "you don't even believe the principles of Christianity" is nothing at all like a rebuttal of my argument, and the Christian who opposes homosexual marriage still has an argument for his inconsistency staring him in the face. To suggest otherwise is to tell me that I have no way, even in theory, to offer an argument to someone who disagrees with me.
I am just amazed at how brilliantly it fits together. And while I'm posting Escher images, I may as well add my other favorite, "Three Worlds":
I love this stuff.
There's the nigger serenader and the others of his race... I'm sure he won't be missed!This made me wonder when 'banjo serenader' became standard. I found the answer: from Martyn Green's Treasury, quoted here:
It was not until 1947 that any form of criticism was leveled at the use of this word, yet the D'Oyly Carte had played in the United States many times from 1934 on. However, serious objections were expressed in 1947. Rupert D'Oyly Carte approached Sir Alan P. Herbert, a contemporary lyricist, to provide alternatives to the word, both in this song and in the Mikado's song. There was no difficulty over this one -- the word was simply changed to "banjo player," basing the change on Gilbert's meaning of the word when he wrote it, viz., the itinerant street singer who, in imitation of the Negro minstrel, a craze that had come over from the United States, was using burnt cork and twanging away on a banjo at virtually every street corner.The other thing I found notable and surprising in the 1926 recording was a lyric change that I had not encountered before: a reference to 'that singular anomaly, the prohibitionist' as something that never would be missed. Prohibition lasted from 1920 to 1933 in the United States. I'm woefully ignorant about the history of the rest of the world (product of American public schools...) -- was there a British or English equivalent?
"It is an overdue day, but a good day," said State Senator William J. Knight, a Palmdale Republican who was the author of a successful ballot measure in 2000 opposing same-sex marriages. "Finally the courts have taken action to put an end to the anarchy in San Francisco."A good rule of thumb for Senator Knight: in general, if a practice can be halted by a court order, 'anarchy' is not a good description of it.
What's more, being carved into bits and chunks and shipped to a dozen different universities and institutions seems no more distasteful than decomposing in the dark underground or being burned to char in a crematory retort. There's nothing wrong with a post-mortem adventure. (I'm told that if you donate your brain to the Harvard Brain Bank, for instance, it rides up front in the cockpit on the plane to Boston.) I'm happy to donate my body to science as long as no one profits off my parts.I really just don't understand why that should be an issue -- why shouldn't I want people to profit off my body parts? I think the best case scenario would involve *many* people profiting *a lot* from my body parts. The author goes on to make the perfectly reasonable point that the system might work better if there could be some assurance that I or my loved ones could be guaranteed some of the profit. But I still think the bold claim is weird.
“Heaps v. Headaches and Human Lives” Abstract: Alastair Norcross has argued for a principle of aggregation of harms. On his view, relatively minor harms to a number of individuals 'add up' and can in principle outweigh much greater individual harms. So, for instance, there is some finite number n of mild headaches such that n mild headaches would be worse than one person being tortured to death. I will present Norcross’s argument and defend it from the objection that it is merely an instance of the sorites paradox. In so doing, I offer a kind of response to a potentially broad range of attempts assimilate arguments to the sorites paradox.
Howdy all! I'll be directing the Rice Light Opera Society in their production of Gilbert and Sullivan's The Pirates of Penzance, March 18-27, at Will Rice College, Rice University. Shows are Thursday-Saturday at 8pm (except Friday 3/26, which is at 10pm). Tickets are $5 for Rice students, $10 others. For reservations, directions, and more info, please go to http://HailPoetry.com/ Hope you can make it! JoeI expect the show will be good, and if you're in Houston (or will be one of those weekends), I think you should see it. I'll be there the 27th. But what I wanted to focus on in my blog was this sentence: "I'll be directing ... The Pirates of Penzance, March 18-27." Directing is certainly "time-apt" -- it's something that people do, and the event of the directing does exist in time. So, for instance, there's nothing at all odd about my saying that I directed a show last spring, or that Wolfgang Petersen will direct Ender's Game in 2006. But when exactly does directing occur? It sounds odd to me for Joe to say that he will direct Pirates March 18, since, presumably, his work as director will by then be finished. Then again, it does seem possible, at least in principle, for a director to 'quit' a show very, very late in the process -- maybe even after performances have begun. So what do we think? What are the (non-deflationary, please) truth conditions for "Joe directing the show at time t."? A few pieces of intuitive data to keep in mind:
The 49ers? They're all set to embrace Tim Rattay, who is 26-years young, cheap and unproven after two solid starts and one hideous breakdown in Green Bay last season.14/30, 142 yards, 1 TD, 1 INT. This compares to an average of 212 passing yards per game allowed by Green Bay last year. I can't find numbers for the other statistics. Not good, but not a horrible breakdown. Tim'll be alright.
Garcia: Gone. Terrell Owens: Presumed gone for months, now in trade-grievance limbo, but most assuredly never to play another down for the 49ers despite their crying need for a game-breaking receiver. Garrison Hearst: One-way ticket out of town....after he asked for it, when we signed Barlow to a long contract and clearly intended him to the be starter.
The offensive line: In "transition," a word you'll hear a lot this summer around the 49ers' Santa Clara training facility, after the team declined for financial reasons to retain three-time Pro Bowler Ron Stone and versatile Derrick Deese.Yeah, I know. Good point. Very understandable 'financial reasons', though... it's called NFL regulations and the salary cap.
For years, during the fat-cat days of Eddie DeBartolo and his bottomless money pit, San Francisco was the franchise that didn't mind paying for the top two players at every position -- one to start for them, and the other one so he couldn't start for any other NFL team. Steve Young stood on the sideline holding Joe Montana's clipboard for three years. End of story. But that was long ago, long ago. The 49ers of today are the 49ers of John York, who announced he intended to run the club more like a "business" and has gone about doing so, right down to the point of going 7-9 and then stripping away much of the playmaking talent from even that club.Again I say, salary cap. The 49ers can't spend that much any more, BECAUSE THEY'RE NOT ALLOWED TO. There is no indication in the article that salary cap considerations had anything to do with any of the 49ers moves. I can understand a disgruntled fan thinking this way... but a sports writer? Give me a break.
I've always wondered if it were possible for someone to get elected President with a truly secret agenda in the back of their mind. Could a sufficiently determined individual mouth the right platitudes, do the right things, get to know the right people, and then take hold of the greatest office in the land and use it for some strange purpose? Such things are hardly unknown. Our recent history is filled with examples of covert agents how managed to remain under cover for years or even decades. Look at how high the Cambridge Spies rose in Britain before their fall. Or look at Robert Hansen and Aldrich Ames. They managed to pull off their deceptions for years without being detected. And this, I might add, they managed despite the fact that, to do their work, they needed to be known to Soviet (or Russian) intelligence and actively cooperate with them, thereby opening up any number of chances for exposure. But what if someone was a really deep sleeper agent? Or simply a rogue individual with a private agenda? How could they be detected? How could they be stopped?Yoshida goes on to say some pretty silly things about John Kerry and George Bush. I don't know if the guy is 'for real' or not. But I think the quoted introduction is interesting to think about. I guess what I really want to turn out to be the correct solution is that any person who sufficiently advances in American politics to become President would benefit more from the nation's prosperity than from fulfilling what alternative agenda he might have had coming in. Unfortunately, that's just not plausible, the way the status quo is set up. A U.S. President just doesn't have all that much to gain from U.S. prosperity. Maybe it's time for a change. In the business world, executives and board members are required to own shares of their corporation -- this guarantees an incentive to look out for the corporation's best interest. Maybe we should do something like that for the Presidency. Here's my idea. We'll hook up the President's body to a sophisticated machine that takes as input economic performance data, crime rates, poverty rates, war casualties and injuries, corporate scandals, light-rail crashes, and Nielson ratings for reality TV shows. Whenever something bad happens to the nation, the machine would respond by causing physical pain to the President's body. A hundred soldiers die in Iraq? The machine breaks George Bush's left pinky. It could work.
A Los Angeles Times music critic who wrote that a Richard Strauss opera was "pro-life" -- meaning a celebration of life -- was stunned to pick up the paper and find his review changed by a literal-minded copy editor to read "anti-abortion." Music critic Mark Swed said the copy editor was adhering to a strict Times policy banning the phrase "pro-life" as offensive to people who support abortion, and didn't seem to realize that the epic Strauss opera "Die Frau Ohne Schatten" had nothing to do with that politically charged issue.
It is possible to construct a list of slightly-increasing harms, from 'having a mild headache' to 'being tortured to death'. For any two consecutive items on that list, H1 and H2, where H2 is slightly worse than H1, there is some finite number of instances of H1 such that that number would outweigh one instance of H2. So, for instance, a billion bad headaches is worse than one REALLY bad headache. But, given the transitivity of 'worse than', this means that there is some (astronomical) finite number of headaches that is worse than one instance of being tortured to death.Many people find this conclusion counterintuitive. I do too, but I'm convinced by the argument. My professor (like many of my readers last time around) was not. I found her response very puzzling, though. She said roughly the following. "The argument you're giving is just an instance of the Sorites paradox. Therefore, it is unconvincing, because either: (1) the Sorites paradox has a solution, in which case that solution will also apply to your argument, or (2) the Sorites paradox has no solution, in which case we shouldn't worry about instances of it." I was blown away at the psychological ease with which she discussed especially the second possibility. "If the sorites paradox has no solution"! Surely she's not asking us to accept that some contradictions might be true! All paradoxes must have solutions! If not, the world is seriously gone to hell. I also have doubts about the plausibility with which we can describe this as an instance of the Sorites Paradox, but my thoughts there aren't yet developed enough even for web publishing. They have something to do with what might be the impossibility of vagueness about 'better than'.
George W. Bush is not a culture warrior by inclination. And he clearly did not seek this fight over gay marriage. I'd guess that he, like most Americans, wishes it would go away.I won't pretend to know the man's private desires, but it strikes me as possible to think that President Bush saw that his polls were dropping, and that a lot of big voting block is on his side of -- and feels strongly about -- this issue.
More ominously, four Massachusetts judges, looking to bring about radical social change from the bench, decided that their commonwealth must begin performing same-sex marriages this spring.I guess in a sense this is true, but I love the use of 'must' here -- it makes me think that the judges started telling people they had to marry others of the same gender, whether they like it or not! It's cute.
Whether you favor gay marriage or not, it should be a concern when judges and officials decide to circumvent the democratic process on a core issue.Yeah, don't you hate when the judicial branch does anything?
Marriage, defined as one man and one woman, has been a foundation of our culture for millenniums [sic]. It is society's basic institution for raising children. It expresses the unique relationship between men and women, an ideal based on love and care that is harnessed to the future: the next generation. It is how we protect children from the pain and frequent poverty of fatherlessness and family breakdown. Like private property and the rule of law, marriage is one of a few institution [sic] that hold up democracy.If there's supposed to be a connection between the last line and the rest of the paragraph -- or any justification for the last line whatsoever -- I have no idea what it is.
The virtue of the amendment process is that it requires the consent of the governed. It forces nationwide debate and examination. Why are so many liberals now trying to keep that debate from happening?I'm genuinely not sure what she's talking about here (and not in a smug, superior way). Liberals are trying to stop the debate from happening? Who? How? And if she's right about this claim, I join her in asking Why? I agree with the others who've commented that this is a historic opportunity for any group to get on the right side of an important issue. There are dividends to be earned once now is history. Update: Oh, now I get it! I think this is her 'argument':
1. If the amendment goes through, there will be discussion. 2. Liberals oppose the amendment. 3. Therefore, liberals oppose the discussion.No wonder she didn't spell the argument out clearly. What was it Roderic said? "Humph! These arguments sound very well, but I can't help thinking that, if they were reduced to syllogistic form, they wouldn't hold water."